[Truth and Decorum in the Senate Debates Relating to Executive Patronage]

/ Jean-Christophe Jouffrey
Special Signs to Represent the Pagination of the Original:
  • |231| is the column number 231 in the original

[Extract of] Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress, Twenty-Third Congress….Second Session. 13 February 1835—cols. 426–432

Editorial note : This is an extract of the Register of Debates in Congress for the 13th of February 1835 regarding “Executive Patronage” and the “Power of Removal”, relating to the ability for the POTUS to nominate and dismiss directly members of the Federal Administration, and what Congressional oversight there is on these matters.

Relevance to current questions : Still today, whenever a member of the Federal Administration “resigns”, we hear the explanation that they serve “at the pleasure of the POTUS”, which is nothing else but the royal “placet”, or the “car tel est mon bon plaisir” (“for such is my good pleasure”) of the French monarchs. Questions are asked about the ability to remove and replace even by temporary “acting” roles those in function, which ultimately concerns a vision of practical government oscillating between the extreme positions of either a permanent professional administration, whose role it is to execute impartially the Laws, or a temporary administration, whose competency resides in its dedication to serve the POTUS.

Executive Patronage in the 1835 debate : This Senate debate of February 1835 is about “Executive Patronage” seen as one of the means of action of “Executive Usurpation”, as it relates to the “to the victor the spoils” policy implemented for the first time on a large scale by Andrew Jackson. This meant that a very large number of people up and down the Federal Administration could potentially be replaced at will. At the time, the calculation of those involved in the debate is that up to about 100.000 Federal Officers could perceive that their livelihood depended of the good graces of the POTUS, who could decide to nominate or remove them from office, at his personal leisure.

For the various parts of the opposition, including Calhoun (who had become isolated from the Democrats in power), and Clay and Webster (both from the recently named Whig Party), the use by Jackson of this power, which involved about 2.000 people removed from office and replaced by people loyal to Jackson, needed to be curtailed.

This was not a new question in 1835, in 1826 a select committee to which belonged Thomas Hart Benton, Senator of Missouri, had already come to the conclusion that the Executive Patronage and the Power to Remove, should be curtailed in particular by demanding “That in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by an exercise of the President’s power to remove from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for which such officer may have been removed.” But the associated bills did not pass.

The “direct attack on truth” controversy : In 1835 Calhoun headed a Senate select committee on Executive Patronage, to which Benton belonged, and produced a report, with similar proposals, in which it was stated that this power could be used to “convert the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power, and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and corrupt.” But Benton who was now on the side of the Administration, and opposed to the proposed measures, intervene during the introductory speech of Calhoun, and strenuously objected to the wording as applying to him, and in doing so called it “a bold and direct attack upon truth”, which raised a point of order in the Senate rules regarding the notion of “truth”, decorum and freedom of debating in the Senate.

It is this little interlude, usually omitted from the publications of the speech of Calhoun, which is presented here, as an introduction to several posts on the Executive Patronage question, with a smidgen of tongue on cheek relating to recent events in the US Senate (as well as general questions as to the meaning of “truth” in US politics, and the tone of the current political debate), especially when Senator Goldsborough starts reminiscing about the good old days, and how since then things have become so much more relaxed.

[Truth and Decorum in the Senate Debates Relating to Executive Patronage]

|426| […] Mr. BENTON then rose and spoke for a considerable time against the report, from which he quoted largely, and commented with great warmth and severity. He read the following : “It is to convert the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power, and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and corrupt.”

Mr. B. remarked, “corrupt and supple instruments of power !” and the gentleman has done me the honor to identify me with them, as base and corrupt. Sir, |427| the Senate prevents me from applying that epithet to him which he deserves, after connecting me with such odious and infamous epithets—of identifying me with those supple and corrupt instruments of power. It is not necessary that I should repel the accusation, for the whole people of the United States will drive it back upon him as a bold and direct attack upon truth !

Mr. POINDEXTER rose and called the gentleman to order. He wished to know whether a Senator on that floor had a right to say that any thing said on it was “a direct attack upon truth ?”

Mr. CALHOUN hoped the gentleman from Mississippi would allow the Senator from Missouri to proceed. He cared nothing about the Senator’s assertion that he (Mr. C.) was bold enough to make an attack upon truth. Nothing that fell from that gentleman deserved his attention.

Mr. POINDEXTER. My object in calling the Senator from Missouri to order was, that the words which he ascribed to the gentleman from South Carolina, that it was “a direct attack upon truth,” might be taken down. I ask if it is in order to use such language ?

[Here such was the confusion that prevailed in the Senate—several members speaking at the same time—that not one word of what was said by the Vice President reached the reporter’s gallery. When, however, order was in some measure restored—]

Mr. POINDEXTER approached the Clerk’s table, and the words were taken down by the Secretary.

Mr. BENTON exclaimed, “Take them down ! take them down ! I’ll sign them !”

Mr. LINN said, would it not be as well to take down the exceptionable words contained in the report, and which the Senator from Missouri had read ?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I wish to know whether the words were in order ?

The VICE PRESIDENT said the Senator might deny the truth of the statement without intending to impute a wilful misrepresentation of the truth to the gentleman from South Carolina. If the Senator had said that the gentleman had not told the truth, he would have been out of order.

Mr. POINDEXTER asked whether the Senator from Missouri, in alleging that the Senator from South Carolina had made “a direct attack on truth,” was not out of order ?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The impression of the Chair is, that it was in order to deny the truth of a statement read on that floor, but not what is stated by an honorable Senator.

Mr. WEBSTER dissented from the opinion of the Chair. The word untruth implied an intentional misrepresentation, and the application of it to a member of that body was unparliamentary and out of order. A member may not, said Mr. W., get up and say that the words of another are untrue, because truth is synonymous with veracity. He might say that the words of another were founded in misconception ; that he was mistaken, or had unintentionally made an erroneous statement, but he could not charge him with uttering an untruth. He remembered a case of the kind in the other House, when a gentleman of distinction from South Carolina presided there. A member applied certain epithets to the war then pending with Great Britain—he said it was a French war, and another member answered that it was untrue. The Chair decided that the charge implied want of veracity, and that the member making it was out of order.

Mr. W. then appealed to the Senate from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. CUTHBERT said that, in a contest like this, it must be in the power of the presiding officer to show the meaning of the word “truth.” There were several |428| kinds of truths—political, mathematical, philosophical, moral, and many other. Now, it was entirely within the competence of the presiding officer to determine whether it was intended to impute, or not, moral crime to any member—such was the latitude of the case.

The VICE PRESIDENT said that, inasmuch as he did not understand the Senator from Missouri to intimate an intention of untruth on the part of the gentleman from South Carolina, he conceived the Senator was not out of order.

Mr. KING, of Alabama, regretted exceedingly the course the debate had taken, because he feared that it would lead to still greater excitement. He regretted it because he thought the gentleman from South Carolina himself had given utterance to expressions produced by the feelings of the moment. He did not, however, admit that the expressions, either of the gentleman from South Carolina or the gentleman from Missouri, were such as to justify the calling them to order. He had, on many occasions, heard in debate expressions such as had fallen from the Senator from Missouri, when no notice was taken of them. It was not unusual to hear the words “unfounded in fact” used in debate. A statement is made by a gentleman as not of his own knowledge, and another applies to it the words “unfounded in fact.” This did not put the gentleman applying such language out of order. What the Senator from Missouri said in reference to the Senator from South Carolina did not impeach the personal veracity of that gentleman ; and he did hope that the Senator from Missouri would say so at once, and, by putting an end to the question of order, permit the debate to go on. If he was compelled to record his vote, he should be obliged to say that the words of the Senator from Missouri did not impeach the personal veracity of the Senator from South Carolina, and consequently did not put him out of order. He hoped that his friend from Missouri would say that his language did not imply a want of veracity in the Senator from South Carolina, and at once put an end to the delicate question before the Senate.

Mr. LEIGH concurred in the remarks of the Senator from Massachusetts, and consequently should feel himself compelled to vote against the decision of the Chair.

Mr. BIBB said that before he recorded his name on this question, he wished to say that he should feel himself bound to sustain the decision of the Chair, lest the rules of this body, instead of regulating, might be used to restrain debate. He considered the expression “a direct attack on truth” not out of order ; it was a mere inference, and was not intended to imply a wilful perversion of facts.

Mr. GOLDSBOROUGH said that it had been many years since he had the honor of a seat on this floor, and the rules for regulating debate might have become more relaxed than formerly, but he was persuaded that if, in the times to which he alluded, a member here had charged another with “a bold and direct attack on truth,” not only would the presiding officer have called him to order, but the call would have resounded from all sides of the House. The preservation of decorum in debate is among the first objects of the rules of all deliberative bodies—it is an armor which is thrown around the members for their defence.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Bibb] had been pleased to say that he should sustain the decision of the Chair ; lest the rules of the Senate, instead of regulating, might be made to restrain debate. There is (said Mr. G.) another and a much more dangerous means by which the freedom of debate may become restricted ; and that is, the overawing debate.

Picture to yourself, sir, said he, on this floor, (and I desire to be understood as making no particular allusions,) |429| a bold, and daring, and reckless man, the reliance of a dominant party, fired with party zeal, and ready to carry measures without calculating consequences ; what, he asked, would be the effect produced by such a man upon gentlemen of more meek and gentle tempers ? Would it not be to seal their lips and awe them into silence ? It is important, therefore, that all due decorum should be preserved in debate : it is essential to its freedom, and constitutes an ægis with which every Senator is to be clad. Mr. G. said he had much satisfaction in looking back and reflecting upon the distinguished character of this Senate, marked as it had been for the highest degree of good order, from the first establishment of the Government.

Mr. G. said he would not undertake, as other Senators had suggested, to submit the declaration, “a direct attack on truth,” to either a philosophical or fanciful definition : he regarded it as a substantial charge upon moral integrity, blended with a manner that could not be mistaken. Such an attack on moral character could not be explained away ; the truth of the Senator was the target directly aimed at ; it was no incidental or accidental affair ; and as such Mr. G. regarded it as unfit and out of order.

Mr. LINN rose to express his deep regret that any thing should have arisen to disturb the harmony of the debate. For the honorable Senator from South Carolina he entertained ; the utmost respect, and for his honorable colleague, whom he had known so many years, he felt the warmest friendship. He regretted the unpleasant occurrence of that morning, though he was bound to say it was not an unusual one. He felt convinced that the Senate had been often out of order, in the course of debate, and the friends of the administration frequently had to bear much from gentlemen on the other side. He had had his feelings often outraged by language used on that floor, and he had spoken of it as disgraceful to the Senate of the United States. Were a Senator to apply language to him not respectful, he would reply to him in such a way as not to make the question of order doubtful ; he would reply to him in a manner not to be misunderstood.

Mr. CUTHBERT said that on one point there could be but little question with the Senator from Massachusetts, and that was, that that report was strongly characterized by party feeling ; that it contained language which approached to personality could not be doubted by any one who should read it. And there were many expressions, too, which had been the rallying words of the party, not only here, but which had been reverberated throughout this Union. Then, what was to be expected ? A party debate. The gentleman from South Carolina identifies the Senator from Missouri with those whom he has chosen to term supple and corrupt instruments of party. When cause is given, the intent follows ; when the spark is laid, the magazine is blown up. It was proper that decorum should be observed ; but it was highly proper that, when it was disturbed, the blame should be charged upon the individual who should have produced the disorder.

Mr. HENDRICKS wished to state, in a very few words, the reasons why he differed from the decision of the Chair. He agreed with the Chair in the principle he had stated, and the whole case turned on that point : did or did not the language of the Senator from Missouri, imply a want of veracity in the Senator from South Carolina ? He had hoped that the Senator from Missouri, by disclaiming such an application as suggested by the Senator from Alabama, would have suffered the debate on the bill to go on. If the Senator from Missouri had disclaimed such intention, he would have felt bound to vote for sustaining the decision of the Chair ; but inasmuch as he had not done so, he was bound to believe |430| that he made an improper imputation as to the Senator from South Carolina, and he should therefore vote to sustain the appeal.

Mr. POINDEXTER said he had no personal feeling in calling the Senator from Missouri to order. He thought the Senate should debate within the bounds of decorum ; if not, personal collision might follow. The words themselves were words to be decided—not the intention, not the cause which led to them. The simple question was, was it in order for one Senator to say of another, “You have made a direct attack on truth ?”

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN regretted exceedingly that he was called upon to give his vote on the unpleasant question before the Senate, and he would have been very glad if the Senator from Missouri had taken the course suggested by his friend from Alabama. But was it desirable that decorum should be kept up in the Senate, and was it decorous for a Senator to say on that floor that another had made a direct attack on truth ? What, asked he, is our object here ! Was it not to preserve to the fullest extent the freedom of debate ? And if such language was used by one Senator, to another, would not the freedom of debate be put an end to ? He was compelled to differ with the Chair in its decision that the character of the words used by the Senator from Missouri did not imply an intentional departure from veracity. It was the greatest praise that could be applied to a man to say that he was a man of truth ; and to permit a Senator to apply to another, pointing to him as the Senator from Missouri did, and in the way he did, language implying a want of truth, was to lose the decorum that should be preserved on that floor.

Mr. TYLER could not, after the most anxious consideration given to this subject, dissent from the decision given by the Chair ; and his opinions, instead of being shaken by quotations from Jefferson’s Manual, were strengthened by them. No member in debate, the Manual said, is to call another by name, or to make ascriptions to him of improper motives. Now, he did not think that the Senator from Missouri, as decided by the Chair, imputed a want of veracity to the Senator from South Carolina. The Senator from Alabama [Mr. King] had no right to call on the Senator from Missouri, as he did, to disclaim any personal imputations. The Senator from Missouri was silenced ; he was in a manner under trial ; he could make no explanations unless voluntarily. He should have been glad if the Senator from Missouri had taken the course suggested by the Senator from Alabama, for he was sure that the Senator was greatly mistaken when he supposed that the Senator from South Carolina applied the language of the report to him or to his friends. The Senator from South Carolina makes a report in which he applies certain epithets to a certain description of office-holders ; and the Senator from Missouri, understanding him as alluding to himself and his friends, makes assertions that he is not corrupt, and that the party with which he acts is not corrupt, and that it is untrue to say that they are. I will not, said Mr. T., ask the gentleman from Missouri for an explanation of his words. I shall, said he, put my own construction on them, and will not by my vote say that the Senator from Missouri intended to apply a want of veracity to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. PRESTON expressed himself in favor of allowing great latitude in debate. For his own part, he thought it would be better that gentlemen would concur, and allow the debate to go on, and let the question of order be laid on the table.

Mr. POINDEXTER, in reply to the Senator from South Carolina, said he certainly should have waived the question of order, had he not felt it his duty to bring this matter directly before the Senate for its decision on it. It was not so much a question as regarded the Senators |431| from Missouri and South Carolina ; it was an isolated question. Was it in order for a gentleman to rise in his place, and say that another had made “a direct attack on truth ?” If it was in order, let the Senate decide so, he could protect himself. He asked the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Tyler] if such language was decorous ? If it was consistent with good manners ? Was it fit to be used between gentlemen ? The time had been when that body (the Senate) was the most decorous body in the world—he referred to the time alluded to by the Senator from Maryland, [Mr. Goldsbohough,] and the result was that it had acquired the character of being, also, the most dignified body in the world. But if the Senate should decide that the language used by the Senator from Missouri was in order, be it so. He should give his vote that it was not in order.

Mr. KING, of Alabama, expressed his regret that this misunderstanding should have taken place. He had no doubt that the Senator from South Carolina, when he made an attack on the Senator from Missouri, did not intend to convey any other meaning than the gentleman, from his political position, would be inclined to advocate a certain course of measures approved of by his party. The Senator from South Carolina could not mean to identify him with those whom he had designated supple and servile instruments of power. Mr. K. was sure he did not mean such a thing. And he felt convinced, also, that the Senator from Missouri did not intend to impeach the personal veracity of the member from South Carolina ; he therefore hoped the Senator would say so, and that the appeal might be withdrawn.

Mr. BENTON intimated that he should not explain.

Mr. WEBSTER said it was quite impossible that he should withdraw the appeal, unless the honorable gentleman would contrive some mode by which to withdraw the decision of the Chair. If that decision should stand as it was, it would become the law of the Senate, and then one member might apply to another the language used that morning by the Senator from Missouri. The honorable member [Mr. King, of Alabama] contended that the words of the Senator from Missouri imputed no motives to the Senator from South Carolina. Now he (Mr. W.) said the contrary. The word “truth” implied something distinct and specific, and the charge of the want of it carried home to the member charged an intentional departure from veracity. Such language tended to derogate from the character of the member charged in it, and was a departure from that decorum which ought to be observed in the Senate. What was the proper character of debate ? We are not to speak of others (said Mr. W.) as of ourselves—we are not to speak of the proceedings in the other House, and the injunction to speak of others with courtesy was made that we might carry on a debate without turmoil. The question was not as to what might be spoken of parties—of masses—but as to what gentlemen might speak of each other consistentenly with that courtesy which ought to characterize good manners, good feeling, and the order and dignity of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT said he did not understand the gentleman from Missouri as imputing to the Senator a wilful misrepresentation of the fact. Had the Chair been under that impression, it would have decided against the Senator from Missouri. It looked upon the remarks of the Senator as a strong expression of denial of the fact, without calling in question the veracity of the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. WEBSTER contended that the question must be decided on the words used by the Senator from Missouri. Were those the words used which had been taken down ? And the question being precisely on the point—were the words parliamentary ? or did they by |432| the force of their terms imply disrespect ? That was the reason why the decision should be made on the words themselves, and on nothing else.

Mr. CUTHBERT begged leave to add one word more. Suppose some gentleman in the course of a debate had used language of this kind : “The gentleman belongs to a faction intending to raise itself on the ruins of their country.” Would the reply be that the gentleman was in a slight error ? When a party was charged with corruption, and a member was characterized as being one of that party, would it be sufficient for him to say that “the gentleman was in a slight error ?” He begged, therefore, the gentleman from Massachusetts to let the question take that turn given to it by the gentlemen from Virginia and South Carolina, [Mr. Tyler and Mr. Preston.]

The question was here taken, and the decision of the Chair was reversed—yeas 21, nays 23—as follows :

Yeas—Messrs. Bibb, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Cuthbert, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Mangum, Morris, Preston, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright—21.

Nays—Messrs. Bell, Clay, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Webster—23.

The question having been decided, the Chair asked what order would be taken by the Senate. There was a provision in the rules of the other House to meet such a case, but none in the rules of the Senate.

Mr. CALHOUN and Mr. WEBSTER expressed the hope that the Senator from Missouri might be permitted to go on with his remarks ; and

Mr. BENTON, with the permission of the Senate, resumed. [Mr. B’s speech, in extenso, it is believed, has been given in preceding pages.]

Mr. Benton having concluded his speech,

Mr. GOLDSBOROUGH said it would be recollected, by all who heard him, that he had introduced the delineation alluded to by a preliminary remark, which obviated any supposition of a design to make any personal application. The illustration was elicited by the observations of the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. Bibb,] to show other sources of danger to the freedom of debate.

Mr. BENTON expressed himself entirely satisfied with the honorable Senator’s explanation. When that gentleman should have known him longer, he would discover that, if there was one trait in his (Mr. B’s) character more prominent than another, it was that of abstinence from saying any thing that could hurt the feelings of any gentleman. But when attacked he was always ready to defend himself.

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