Calhoun: Speech on Executive Patronage, February 1835

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[Extract of] The Works of John C. Calhoun, vol. II, 1856.—Speech on Executive Patronage delivered in the Senate, February 13th, 1835—pp. 446–465

Editorial note : This is a speech of John C. Calhoun made in the US Senate on the 13th of February 1835 on the occasion of a bill presented by himself meant to curtail the extent of “Executive Patronage” and the “Power of Removing” from office, relating to the ability for the POTUS to nominate and dismiss directly members of the Federal Administration, and what Congressional oversight there is on these matters. This was seen to be part of what at the time was called the “Executive Usurpation”, the Executive Overreach of today

Relevance to current questions : Still today, whenever a member of the Federal Administration “resigns”, we hear the explanation that they serve “at the pleasure of the POTUS”, which is nothing else but the royal “placet”, or the “car tel est mon bon plaisir” (“for such is my good pleasure”) of the French monarchs. Questions are asked about the ability to remove and replace even by temporary “acting” roles those in function, which ultimately concerns a vision of practical government oscillating between the extreme positions of either a permanent professional administration, whose role it is to execute impartially the Laws, or a temporary administration, whose competency resides in its dedication to serve the POTUS.

Executive Patronage in the 1835 debate : This Senate debate of February 1835 is about “Executive Patronage” seen as one of the means of action of “Executive Usurpation”, as it relates to the “to the victor the spoils” policy implemented for the first time on a large scale by Andrew Jackson. This meant that a very large number of people up and down the Federal Administration could potentially be replaced at will. At the time, the calculation of those involved in the debate is that up to about 100.000 Federal Officers could perceive that their livelihood depended of the good graces of the POTUS, who could decide to nominate or remove them from office, at his personal leisure.

For the various parts of the opposition, including Calhoun (who had become isolated from the Democrats in power), and Clay and Webster (both from the recently named Whig Party), the use by Jackson of this power, which involved about 2.000 people removed from office and replaced by people loyal to Jackson, needed to be curtailed.

This was not a new question in 1835, in 1826 a select committee to which belonged Thomas Hart Benton, Senator of Missouri, had already come to the conclusion that the Executive Patronage and the Power to Remove, should be curtailed in particular by demanding “That in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by an exercise of the President’s power to remove from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for which such officer may have been removed.” But the associated bills did not pass.

In 1835 Calhoun headed a Senate select committee on Executive Patronage, to which Benton belonged, and produced a report, with similar proposals, in which it was stated that this power could be used to “convert the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power, and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and corrupt.” This time Benton opposed it. The discussion in the Senate gave the occasion of three great speeches, of which this is one, by John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay.

Additionally a heated discussion between Calhoun and Benton gave rise to an amusing “interlude” regarding the notion of “truth” and “decorum” in Senatorial debates which is provided here.

|446| […] SPEECH
On the Bill reported by the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, delivered in the Senate, February 13th, 1835.

Mr. Calhoun said : This is not the first time that the measure now under consideration has been before the Senate. It was introduced eight years ago, on the report of a select |447| committee raised on Executive Patronage, as one of the measures then thought necessary to curtail what, at that time, was thought to be the excessive patronage of the Executive. The party then in opposition, and now in power, then pledged themselves to the community that, should they be elevated to power, they would administer the Government on the principles laid down in the report. Mr. C. said, that it was now high time to inquire how this solemn pledge, which, in his opinion, imposed a sacred obligation, has been redeemed ? Has the plighted faith been kept which the committee gave in the name of the party ? Before I undertake to answer this question, it may be proper to inquire—Who constituted that committee, and what is the position they now occupy ? The chairman was Mr. Benton, now a member of the Senate and of the present committee. The name of Mr. Macon, then a Senator from North Carolina, so well known to the country, stands next ; Mr. Van Buren, now Vice-President ; Mr. Hickerson, now Secretary of the Treasury ; Mr. Johnson, now a member of the House from Kentucky ; Mr. White, then, as now, Senator from Tennessee ; Mr. Holmes of Maine ; Mr. Hayne of South Carolina ; Mr. Findlay of Pennsylvania ; all, at the time, distinguished members of this body.

Such was the committee, which, then and now, stands so high in the confidence of the party now in power. Hear what their report says upon the subject of Executive Patronage.

[Here an extract from the Report was read as follows :]

“To be able to show to the Senate a full and perfect view of the power and workings of Federal patronage, the committee addressed a note, immediately after they were charged with this inquiry, to each of the departments, and to the Postmaster-General, requesting to be informed of the whole number of persons employed, and the whole amount of money paid out, under the direction of their respective departments ? The answers received are herewith submitted, and made part of this report. |448| With the ‘Blue Book,’ they will discover enough to show that the predictions of those who were not blind to the defects of the constitution, are ready to be realized ; that the power and influence of Federal patronage, contrary to the argument in the ‘Federalist,’ is an overmatch for the power and influence of State patronage ; that its workings will contaminate the purity of all elections, and enable the Federal Government, eventually, to govern throughout the States, as effectually as if they were so many provinces of one vast empire.

“The whole of this great power will centre in the President. The King of England is the ‘fountain of honor ;’ the President of the United States is the source of patronage. He presides over the entire system of Federal appointments, jobs, and contracts. He has ‘power’ over the ‘support’ of the individuals who administer the system. He makes and unmakes them. He chooses from the circle of his friends and supporters, and may dismiss them ; and, upon all the principles of human actions, will dismiss them, as often as they disappoint his expectations. His spirit will animate their actions in all the elections to State and Federal offices. There may be exceptions ; but the truth of a general rule is proved by the exception. The intended check and control of the Senate, without new constitutional or statutory provisions, will cease to operate. Patronage will penetrate this body, subdue its capacity of resistance, chain it to the car of power, and enable the President to rule as easily, and much more securely with, than without the nominal check of the Senate. If the President was himself the officer of the people, elected by them, and responsible to them, there would be less danger from this concentration of all power in his hands ; but it is the business of statesmen to act upon things as they are, not as they would wish them to be. We must then look forward to the time when the public revenue will be doubled ; when the civil and military officers of the Federal Government will be quadrupled ; when its influence over individuals will be multiplied to an indefinite extent ; when the nomination by the President can carry any man through the Senate, and his recommendation can carry any measure through the two Houses of Congress ; when the principle of public action will be open and avowed ; the President wants my vote, and I want his patronage ; I will vote as he wishes, and he will give me the office I wish for. What will this be, but the government of one man ? and what is the government of one man, but a monarchy ? Names are nothing. The nature of a thing is in its substance, and the name soon accommodates itself to the substance. The first Roman Emperor was styled Emperor of the Republic, and the last French Emperor took the same title ; and their respective countries were just as essentially monarchical before, as after the assumption of these titles. It cannot be |449| denied or dissembled but that the Federal Government gravitates to the same point, and that the election of the Executive by the Legislature quickens the impulsion.

“Those who make the President must support him. Their political fate becomes identified, and they must stand or fall together. Right or wrong, they must support him ; and if he is made contrary to the will of the people, he must be supported not only by votes and speeches, but by arms. A violent and forced state of things will ensue ; individual combats will take place ; and the combats of individuals will be the forerunner to general engagements. The array of man against man will be the prelude to the array of army against army, and of State against State. Such is the law of nature ; and it is equally in vain for one set of men to claim an exemption from its operation, as it would be for any other set to suppose that, under the same circumstances, they would not act in the same manner. The natural remedy for all these evils, would be to place the election of President in the hands of the people of the United States. He would then have a power to support him, which would be as able, as willing to aid him when he was himself supporting the interests of the country, as they would be to put him down when he should neglect or oppose those interests. Your committee, looking at the present mode of electing the President as the principal source of all this evil, have commenced their labors at the beginning of this session, by recommending an amendment to the constitution in that essential and vital particular ; but in this, as in many other things, they find the greatest difficulty to be in the first step. The committee recommend the amendment, but the people cannot act upon it until Congress shall ‘propose’ it, and peradventure Congress will not ‘propose ’ it to them at all.

“It is no longer true that the President, in dealing out offices to Members of Congress, will be limited, as supposed in the Federalist, to the inconsiderable number of places which may become vacant by the ordinary casualties of deaths and resignations ; on the contrary, he may now draw, for that purpose, upon the entire fund of the Executive patronage. Construction and legislation have accomplished this change. In the very first year of the constitution, a construction was put upon that instrument which enabled the President to create as many vacancies as he pleased, and at any moment that he thought proper. This was effected by yielding to him the kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the formality of a trial. The authors of the Federalist had not foreseen this construction ; so far from it, they had asserted the contrary, and, arguing logically from the premises, ‘that the dismissing power was appurtenant to the appointing power,” they had maintained, in No. 77 of that standard work, that, as the consent of the Senate was necessary to the |450| appointment of an officer, so the consent of the same body would be equally necessary to his dismission from office. But this construction was overruled by the first Congress which was formed under the constitution ; the power of dismission from office was abandoned to the President alone, and, with the acquisition of this prerogative alone, the power and patronage of the Presidential office was instantly increased to an indefinite extent, and the argument of the Federalist against the capacity of the President, to corrupt the Members of Congress, founded upon the small number of places which he could use for that purpose, was totally overthrown. So much for construction. Now for the effects of legislation ; and without going into an enumeration of statutes which unnecessarily increase the Executive patronage, the Four Years’ Appointment Law will alone be mentioned ; for this single act, by vacating almost the entire civil list, once in every period of a presidential term of service, places more offices at the command of the President than were known to the constitution at the time of its adoption, and is, of itself amply sufficient to overthrow the whole of the argument which was used in the Federalist.”

It is impossible, said Mr. C., to read this report, which denounces in such unqualified terms the excess and the abuses of patronage at that time, without being struck with the deplorable change which a few short years have wrought in the character of our country. Then we were sensitive in all that related to our liberty ; and jealous of patronage and governmental influence : so much so, that a few inconsiderable removals, three or four printers, roused the indignation of the whole country—events which would now pass unnoticed. We have grown insensible, become callous and stupid.

But let us turn to the question which I have asked. How has the plighted faith of the party been fulfilled ? Have the abuses then denounced been corrected ? Has the Four Years’ Law been repealed ? Has the election of the President been given to the people ? Has the exercise of the dismissing power by the President, which was then pronounced to be a dangerous violation of the constitution, been restored to Congress ? All these pledges have been forgotten. Not one has been fulfilled. And what justification, I ask, is offered for so gross a violation of faith ? None is even attempted—|451| the delinquency is acknowledged ; and the only effort which the Senator from Missouri has made to defend his own conduct, and that of the administration, in adopting the practice which he then denounced, is on the plea of retaliation. He says that he has been fourteen years a member of the Senate ; and that, during the first seven, no friend of his had received the favor of the Government ; and contends that it became necessary to dismiss those in office, to make room for others who had been, for so long a time, beyond the circle of Executive favor. What, Mr. C. asked, is the principle, when correctly understood, on which this defence rests ? It assumes that retaliation is a principle in its nature so sacred, that it justifies the violation of the constitution, the breach of plighted faith, and the subversion of principles, the observance of which had been declared to be essential to the liberty of the country. The avowal of such a principle may be justified at this time by interested partisans ; but the time must arrive, when a more impartial tribunal will regard it in a far different light, and pronounce that sentence which violated faith and broken pledges deserve. Mr. C. said, the bill now before the Senate affords an opportunity to the dominant party to redeem its pledges, as late as it is, and to avert, at least in part, that just denunciation which an impartial posterity will otherwise most certainly pronounce on them. He hoped that they would embrace the opportunity, and thereby prove that, in expelling the former administration they were not merely acting a part, and that the solemn pledges and promises then given were not electioneering tricks, devoid of sincerity and truth. I consider it, said Mr. C., as an evidence of that deep degeneracy, which precedes the downfall of a republic, when those elevated to power, forget the promises on which they were elevated ; the certain effect of which is to make an impression on the public mind, that all is juggling and tricky in politics—and to create an |452| indifference to political struggles, highly favorable to the growth of despotic power.

[Mr. Benton here rose and made some remarks in defence of himself and the administration ; after which]—

Mr. Calhoun proceeded to show, that the prerogative of turning out of office, committed, without limitation to the President, is a means of increasing at once the Executive power to a dangerous and ruinous extent ; rendering him the head of a party, not founded on principles, but resting on the worst of all bases, that of personal interest and fear.

Having shown that the present administration rose to power by the hopes excited, and professions held out against the very abuses which now had grown to so alarming an excess, Mr. Calhoun deplored, in energetic terms, the falsification of those hopes ; urging the fatal effects which are produced, when the solemn promises and plighted faith of men are broken, and when the people are led to believe that political truth is extinguished, and the most solemn engagements are merely made as stepping stones to power, and as instruments of electioneering.

[Mr. Benton here again rose, and in his usual strain of rude and vulgar insolence, interrupted the debate. He was called to order by Mr. Poindexter of Mississippi, and after some time spent in discussing the point, Mr. Calhoun rose and said :]

I rise to express my surprise at the course pursued by the member from Missouri (Col. Benton) who has just taken his seat. He is a member of the committee, and regularly attended its meetings. While the report was before the committee for consideration, he sat in silence, without whispering the objections now urged with so much violence, and in language so unwarranted. I had not intended to go into the report while the present bill was under consideration. It met the approbation of the whole committee, including |453| that of the Senator from Missouri, and I had a right to expect, at least as far as he was concerned, that it would pass without opposition. Under this impression I had proposed to myself to delay the discussion on the merits of the report, till the resolution to amend the constitution, from which the member dissented, came under consideration ; when an opportunity would be afforded to repel his broad and unfounded assertions and fallacious conclusions, and to establish the correctness of the report on all the points on which it had been assailed ; but the course pursued by the Senator compels me to repel his assertions without further delay.

When the subject of printing the report was under consideration a few days since, he asserted, in the boldest manner, that the estimate of the committee in relation to the surplus revenue was so wild, that wild was a term too moderate ; and that none less strong than “hallucination” could be applied. I then repelled his objections in a manner which I trust was satisfactory to every one capable of estimating the force of just reasoning ; but in order that there might not be a shadow of doubt on a point of so much importance, I have since re-examined the subject, and now pronounce, without the fear of contradiction, that on the Senator’s own premises, the estimate of the surplus, as reported by the committee, is correct—notwithstanding the outrageous extravagance of his assertions. The Senator did not venture any argument of his own to rebut the conclusion of the committee ; but, with that deference to power which is one of the characteristics of those with whom he is politically associated, he relied solely upon the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, furnished in his annual report. Now, said Mr. C., it is remarkable that the estimates of the Secretary of the income of the current year, instead of supporting the unwarranted assertions of the Senator from Missouri, coincide remarkably with the estimate of the committee ; which shows with what disregard to the state of the facts the Senator ventures |454| his assertions, though uttered with so much confidence. But that there may be no further question on this point, I will turn to the report of the Secretary itself, and compare in detail his estimate with that submitted by the committee. Beginning, then, with the customs, which is the principal source of our revenue, the Secretary estimates the income from this source at sixteen millions of dollars ; the committee at sixteen millions three hundred and seventy thousand dollars ; making a difference of but three hundred and seventy thousand dollars—a very striking coincidence, considering that the calculations rest upon grounds so essentially different. The Secretary assumes as his basis the income from the customs for the last year, without taking into the estimate that a very considerable portion of the receipts from that source last year were derived from duties accruing the preceding year, when the rates were much higher than they are now ; but to balance this error, he omits to take into the account the diminution of the imports of articles subject to duty, in consequence of the disturbed state of the currency, which two sums nearly balance each other ; and thus, by two errors of an opposite character, and of nearly equal magnitude, he has accidentally fallen upon the truth.

As to the next greatest source of our revenue, the public lands, the estimates of the Secretary and the committee exactly coincide ; both placing it at three millions five hundred thousand dollars. The estimates of the remaining resources are placed by the Secretary at $500,070 ; by the committee at $450,000 ; making a difference of $50,070 only. Adding these several items on both sides, the aggregate of the Secretary amounts to $20,000,070 ; and that of the committee to $20,320,000 ; making a difference of but $319,930. So much for the income. As to the expenditure, I am not ignorant that the Secretary estimates it at $19,683,541—making a difference between that and his estimate of the income, of $316,529. The committee, on the |455| contrary, make no estimate of the actual expenditure. Its object was not to estimate the expenditure on the present scale, which is admitted by the Senator himself to be enormous, profuse, and profligate. On the contrary, the object of the committee was to ascertain to what these expenditures might safely be reduced, consistently with the just efficiency of the Government. For this purpose, they selected the year 1823 as the basis on which to rest their estimate—a year which the Senator at that time, and those with whom he then acted, denounced as profuse and extravagant (Mr. Benton assented), and which he even now has the assurance to allude to as extravagant, and attempts to hold me responsible as its author. Well, then, I have taken this extravagant period. I have allowed twenty per cent, upon its expenditure—which so many who now support the present administration, then pronounced as so extravagant. Yes, twenty per cent, on the then expenditure on fortifications—on internal improvements—on pensions, and every other item, all of which the Senator has pronounced to have been so extravagant at that period, that even now he holds the then administration responsible, in his zeal to defend the present. I have gone further. I have added the actual increase of pensions, of which he now complains so much, and to which he mainly attributes the present great increase of expenditure, to the twenty per cent., and find that, with all these heavy additions, the expenditure ought not, at present, to exceed $12,060,412 per annum for the next seven years ; which, deducted from the estimate of the receipts of the present year, as given by the Secretary of the Treasury, and on which the Senator relies for his uncourteous and extravagant assertions, leaves a balance of $7,939,658. If we allow for the surplus revenue now in the treasury, deducting two millions for contingent expense, and the Government portion of the United States Bank stock—making together $13,039,381—and distribute this sum equally in the next |456| seven years, it would give $1,862,768 to each year. Add this to the surplus already obtained, and it would give a balance of upwards of nine millions, as estimated by the committee.

Thus, said Mr. C., the very authority which the Senator resorts to, and on the strength of which he has ventured to utter his bold and lawless denunciations of the report, sustains it in a most remarkable manner, and furnishes a striking proof of the carelessness and inattention of the Senator in his assumptions and his arguments.

Nature, said Mr. C., has bestowed her gifts very unequally and partially upon men. To some she has given one quality, and to others another. She has certainly been profuse of her gifts to the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), in one particular ; she has endowed him, above all men, with boldness—yes, boldness of assertion ; but I must say she has been more niggard in the power of ratiocination. In the face of this confirmation of the estimate of the committee, by his own authority, he has ventured to assail the correctness of the report in the most unqualified manner, and bellowed out that the estimate was extravagant—a fallacy—hallucination !

He has, said Mr. C., not thought proper to repeat these offensive epithets in the speech which he has just delivered ; but in lieu of them he tells us that the report is deceptive—fallacious ; and that, while pretending to moderation but thinly veiled, it partakes of the most bitter party character ; and in the same breath with which he makes these charges, he alleges, as a serious charge against the committee, that they did not go into an inquiry of the cause of the enormous increase of patronage and expenditure, which the Senator cannot deny. I repel, said Mr. C., the charges of the Senator as destitute of any foundation, and affirm that the report is as free from party spirit as it is possible for a paper of this description to be, consistently with truth and a regard to duty. The Senate charged the committee, in its resolution, to inquire into the extent of Executive patronage—its great |457| increase of late—and the expediency and practicability of reducing it ; and how could the committee perform this duty without speaking freely of facts as they exist ? How could they inform the people of these States of the extent of Executive patronage, and the cause of its great increase of late, if they had said less than they have ? The truth is, the committee looked to the facts, and to the facts only ; and treated of them, as much as possible, separate from all personal or party considerations ; and yet the Senator from Missouri, while he charges the committee with giving a party character to the report, with a strange inconsistency and confusion of ideas, blames them for not inquiring into the fact of who were the authors of the present extravagant expenditure and enormous patronage, which he does not pretend to deny. Can the Senator be so blind as not to see that it was impossible to discuss that point without giving a violent party character to the report, which would have ended in preventing the possibility of applying a remedy to what all (and he with others) admit to be a deep and dangerous disease ? I must tell the Senator what, as a member, he ought to know, that the committee were actuated by far higher and more patriotic considerations. They were more studious of devising a remedy to arrest the dangerous progress of events, than of giving a party character to their proceedings, which, however it might bear upon those in power, could not but defeat the object which the Senate had in view in instituting the inquiry. This is the reason why the committee did not inquire who were the authors of the present state of things. They were not deterred, as the Senator seems to insinuate, by the apprehension that the inquiry would implicate others as the authors of the present diseased condition of the country, and exempt the administration. The result of such an inquiry, so far from acquitting, would deeply implicate the administration in all the extravagant expenditures to which the Senator alludes—internal improvements, pensions, removal of |458| the Indians, and those connected with the tariff, as I am prepared to show, whenever a suitable opportunity offers. But before I quit this part of the subject, let me correct an error, into which it would seem strange that the Senator should have fallen. He tells us, with his usual confidence, that Andrew Jackson was the author of the plan of removing the Indians to the west of the Mississippi, and bestows upon him all the honor and the glory, and calls upon the State of Mississippi and the new States to pay the debt of gratitude which they owe him as the author of this noble policy. Is it possible that the Senator could have been ignorant that it was Thomas Jefferson, and not the object of his adoration, who was the real author ? Can he be ignorant that Andrew Jackson himself (as he calls the President), in the treaty with the Cherokees, in 1817, acknowledges this fact ? To come to a later period, is he ignorant that Mr. Monroe recommended, in one of his messages, in the fullest and most explicit manner, the adoption of the policy of the removal of all the Indian tribes within our limits on the east of the Mississippi, to the west of that river ? and that the message of Mr. Monroe was founded on a report of which I was the author, as Secretary of War ? How, with all these facts before him, could the Senator pronounce, as he has, that the present President was the author of the system, and that, as such, he ought to have bestowed upon him exclusively whatever honor and gratitude may belong to it ? Let me tell the Senator, that he who undertakes to correct the errors of others, ought to be very cautious of committing errors himself.

But it seems that the committee have committed an enormous error in the statement of the expenditure which they have given for the ten years from 1823 to 1833. The Senator says that they have entirely overlooked the extraordinary expenditure for the last of these years. A very simple answer will set him right. The object of the committee as |459| the statement itself on its face purports to be, is to exhibit the amount of the expenditures only for the period in question, without inquiring into their nature and character, or for what reason or objects they were incurred, with the view of showing that there was a regular progression and great increase of the expenditures of late. The statement is taken from the official returns of the expenditure during the ten years, and in addition to which the report gives the estimated expenditure for 1834, and the annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury gives the estimate of the expenditure of the current year : so that the committee could have had no object in selecting 1833 with a view of exhibiting the increase to be greater than it really is. It was selected simply because it is the last year of which we have official and certain returns of the expenditures—those of 1834 and 1835 being as yet in some degree uncertain and conjectural. Now, said Mr. C., if the expenditure of 1833 gives us so unfair a result ; if, as the Senator contends, it was swelled so enormously by accidental circumstances, that seven millions ought to be deducted to obtain the true result, what will he say to the estimated expenditure of 1834 and 1835, which are but little short of twenty millions of dollars for each year ? Will he pretend to say that any extraordinary occurrences affected the disbursements of the last year, or that those of the present, as estimated by the Secretary, were not based on the usual items of expenditure ? Let us then lay aside the year 1833, to which the Senator so strenuously objects as being a year of extraordinary disbursements, and take that of the last or present year, the expenditure of which, as I have stated, is estimated at nearly twenty millions of dollars, and how much will the Senator gain by comparing either of those years with 1823 instead of 1833, to which he objects. He will find, on comparison, that the expenditures of 1823, compared with the estimates of this and the last year, are less than one half ; and how will he, who in 1826 condemned |460| the comparatively moderate expenditure of that period, undertake now to justify this enormous increase since—an increase which has occurred mainly under this reform administration, of which the Senator is one of the warmest and most unqualified supporters. But let us turn and examine the items of 1833, to which the Senator objects as being improperly charged upon that year.

First, the Black Hawk war, to which he charges nine hundred thousand dollars. Now, sir, said Mr. C., if I am not greatly mistaken, it was charged on this floor by a gentleman, a friend of the administration, well acquainted with that petty contest, that it originated in the misconduct of the officers and agents of the government ; and might easily have been prevented if the complaints of the Indians had not been improperly neglected by those whose duty it was to attend to them. The Senator then tells us that there were extraordinary Indian treaties in that year, and large sums paid for the removal and subsistence of the Indians—which together amounted to more than one million of dollars. I cannot, said Mr. C., admit this deduction. Of the present extravagant and unreasonable disbursements, there are none more reckless and profuse than those for holding Indian treaties, purchasing Indian lands and removing Indians—which exceed many fold what has heretofore been usual ; and I firmly believe have been the subject of as much, if not more abuse and corruption, than the post-office department.

The Senator next deducts the expenditure under the pension act of 1832, which he denominates loose and wild, but which he takes care to charge to the credit of Congress. I will not, said Mr. C., permit the Senator to shift the responsibility from the shoulders of the administration. It is not to be tolerated that, those who expelled a former administration because of its extravagance, shall now, when the administration thus brought into power proves to be doubly so, lay the blame upon Congress instead of taking it to themselves. |461| I would ask the Senator, when he drew his report in 1826 and denounced the then administration in such severe and unqualified terms for their extravagance, whether every item of expenditure at that time had not been authorized by Congress ? and with what semblance of justice could he then transfer the blame from Congress to the administration, and now, under precisely similar circumstances, from the administration to Congress ? He, and those who are now in power, have reaped the fruit—and as they obtained power by holding others responsible, so it is just that they should, in turn, be held responsible. I go further. I maintain as a sound rule, that every administration, unless it be in a minority in both Houses, ought, upon every principle of justice and policy, to be held responsible ; and it is one of the striking evidences of the diseased and corrupt state of the present times, that such is not the fact. Has not the present administration had, at all times, a majority either in this or the other House ? and has not the President freely exercised his veto whenever any party object was to be effected ? Why then has this appropriation, which the Senator designates as so extravagant and improper, been permitted to pass ? Why was it not defeated in the House of Representatives, where the administration had a settled majority, or arrested by the President’s veto ? I will answer these questions. It is because the administration has not thought proper to make either this, or any other question of principle or policy, a party question. A member may vote on any question of the kind for or against, and be still a good Jackson man. He may be for or against internal improvements—for or against the tariff—for or against this or that expenditure—for or against the Bank, without forfeiting his party character, provided always and nevertheless, he shall submit to party discipline and sustain the party candidates for office. This is the only cohesive principle ; this is the only subject deemed of sufficient importance to be raised to the dignity of a party question. |462| All others, however important in themselves ; however sacred the principle involved ; however essential the measure to the public prosperity, are all, it seems, too insignificant to be made party questions. They are all left open questions, in reference to which the faithful may take either side. Yes, even the Bank itself is not a party question—of which we have a most striking illustration in the fact that General Jackson bestowed the highest gift in his power on a Senator (Mr. Forsyth), who had openly, on this floor, in the very heat of the controversy, avowed himself a Bank man—while other Senators who were openly opposed to the institution were denounced ; thus furnishing a most striking illustration of the truth of what I have asserted, that the only cohesive principle which binds together the powerful party rallied under the name of General Jackson, is official patronage. Their object is to get and to hold office ; and their leading political maxim, openly avowed on this floor by one of the former Senators from New-York, now governor of that State (Mr. Marcy), is that, “to the victors belong the spoils of victory !” a sentiment recently reiterated during the present session, as I understand, by an influential member in the other House, and who had the assurance to declare every man a hypocrite who does not avow it. Can any one, who will duly reflect on these things, venture to say that all is sound, and that our Government is not undergoing a great and fatal change ? Let us not deceive ourselves—the very essence of a free government consists in considering offices as public trusts, bestowed for the good of the country, and not for the benefit of an individual or a party ; and that system of political morals which regards offices in a different light, as public prizes to be won by combatants most skilled in all the arts and corruption of political tactics, and to be used and enjoyed as their proper spoils—strikes a fatal blow at the very vitals of free institutions.

Mr. C. said, experience has shown that there is a great |463| tendency in our system to degenerate into this diseased state ; and I will venture to repeat (it cannot be done too often), what is stated in the report, that whenever the Executive patronage shall become sufficiently strong to form a party based on its influence exclusively, the liberty of the country, should that state of things continue for any considerable period, must be lost. We would make a great mistake were we to suppose that, because the Government of Great Britain can maintain its freedom under an immense patronage, ours also can. The genius of the two governments in this particular is wholly dissimilar ; so much so as to form a perfect contrast. It is the feature by which they are most distinguished. No free government that ever existed could maintain its liberty under so much patronage as that of Great Britain, and there are few that could not bear more than ours. But, said Mr. C., it is a great subject, which I cannot enter upon on the present occasion. I return to the objection which the Senator made to the statement of the expenditures of the year 1833. I could not be ignorant, said Mr. C., in making a movement against Executive patronage, that I would bring down upon me the vengeance of that great and powerful corps now held together by this single cohesive principle—a principle as flexible as India rubber, and as tough too. The history of the world proves that he who attempts reformation, attempts it at no small hazard. I know the relation which the Senator bears to the dominant party. He is identified with them,

[Here Mr. Benton said, Mrs. Royal says so ; to which Mr. C. re plied, she says truly ; and proceeded,]

and is their organ on the present occasion. His position compels him to adopt the course he has pursued.

There remain, then, only two items of the seven millions to be deducted : certain refunded duties, and the payment under the Danish convention, amounting to less than one |464| million and a half, which, if they were paid during the year, may be deducted as of an extraordinary nature, and for which the administration is not responsible ; and thus the seven millions of the Senator dwindles down to about one-fifth of the amount, and the expenditures of the year, after being freed of all the items of which it can justly be, will give an increase of expenditure in the year 1833, over that of 1822, of $11,429,750.

When the report asserted, said Mr. C., that the period from 1823 to 1833, was one of profound peace, to which the Senator so violently objects, the committee were not ignorant of the disturbance with Black Hawk and his followers, on our northwest frontier, which the Senator has attempted to dignify by calling it a war. If my memory serves me, it was limited to a single tribe, headed by a single chief, and did not extend to the nation to which he belonged, and lasted but a few months ; and it is in vain for the Senator from Missouri to impeach the correctness of the report, which asserts the period to be one of profound peace, by calling to our recollection this paltry affair, which originated in the misconduct of the administration, and has swelled into the little magnitude which it attained, by its mismanagement. The Senator from Missouri endeavors to escape from the inconsistency in which he is placed by his report in 1826 and his present position. He says that I was mistaken in placing his defence of General Jackson’s removals from office on political grounds, on the principle of retaliation ; that it was not on that principle, but that of equalizing the offices between the parties. I, said Mr. C., have not the sagacity to perceive the difference as applied to the present case, or by what possibility the Senator can escape from the inconsistency in which he is involved, by substituting the one for the other. What are the facts ? In 1826, as Chairman of the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, he made a report, in which he condemned the principle of removal from |465| office in the severest terms, more severe than those used in the present report. He traced its destructive tendency to the great increase which it was calculated to give to Executive patronage, and pronounced the exercise of the power by the President to be unconstitutional ; and now, when the present administration has carried the exercise of this very power, thus condemned by the Senator, more than thirty-fold beyond any or all preceding administrations, the Senator ventures to rest his vindication of the administration and his support of it on the ground of equalization—equalization ! What allusion, what exception did the Senator make in favor of equalization in his report ? and how can equalization any more than retaliation justify a violation of the constitution.

Mr. C. said, I regret that I have been forced to the discussion of these topics on the present bill, in reference to which the committee is unanimous ; but the extraordinary course of the Senator from Missouri, his bold and unfounded charges and unwarranted imputations, compel me to adopt the course which I have. I now hope that the bill may be allowed to proceed, and that further discussion on the merits of the report will be postponed to some future and more suitable occasion.

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